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Beyond Dilution: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of the Anti Free Riding Impulse in
American Trademark Law
David J. Franklyn1
I.

Introduction
This paper argues that while American dilution law purports to be about

preventing dilutive harm, it really is about preventing free riding on famous marks.
Because of this mismatch between dilution’s stated purpose and hidden goal, it is a
clumsy and largely incoherent doctrinal device. It does not allow judges to turn the antifree riding impulse into a carefully circumscribed set of principles with identifiable
limits. This paper argues that it would be better to scrap dilution altogether and replace it
with an independent cause of action that explicitly prevents free riding in appropriate
circumstances.
On its face, dilution remains a harm-based doctrine which focuses on whether the
unauthorized use of a famous trademark causes the famous mark to lose its selling power
and commercial magnetism – i.e., its ability to distinguish goods or services in the
marketplace.2 The flaw in this approach is that such harm is always speculative and
exceedingly difficult to prove. One can never really be sure, or even fairly confident, that
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a famous mark is losing its selling power due to the use of the same or similar mark by
another. Indeed, plaintiffs find it quite difficult to make this showing.3
And yet plaintiffs often win on their dilution claims. Why is this so? This paper
argues that the plaintiff success rate is due, largely, to the fact that judges and juries in
such situations seek to vindicate an interest that is considerably different than the interest
which dilution law purports to protect. The hidden interest is a desire to punish free
riding. There is a basic conviction that one should not reap where one has not sown.
This is both a moral and economic principle. It is the true driving force in many dilution
cases -- and it is distinct from the stated dilution purpose of protecting famous marks
against dilutive harm. This can be seen from the fact that plaintiffs consistently win cases
when proof of dilutive harm is remote and highly speculative, at best, but free-riding
seems obvious.
The anti free riding impulse can either stay hidden in America trademark law or it
can be openly considered and debated. It is difficult to defend its continued latency.
Having a hidden agenda in the law is not a good thing. It prevents judges from
identifying the actual competing interests at stake in the cases, and it retards the ability of
judges to bring coherency to a particular area of law. It also enables judges to misuse the
concept and to apply it in cases where it ought not to apply. The result has been that in
some instances dilution law has offered too little protection to famous mark owners,4
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Proving dilution was made even more difficult by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in the Victoria’s
Secret case, where the Court held that plaintiffs must prove that dilutive harm has actually begun to occur
as a result of the challenged use; it is no longer enough to show that such harm is likely to occur in the
future. See Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (U.S. 2003).
4
The argument that dilution offers too little protection to trademark owners is contrary to the bulk of
scholarly writing on the subject. Most papers on dilution law – and there are many – have argued that it is
too broad. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.
J. 1687 (1999) (detailing and criticizing the overly broad approach taken to dilution by U.S. courts); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999) (criticizing dilution doctrine as
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while in other cases it has offered too much protection. At a minimum, then, there is a
need to identify the antifree riding impulse in trademark law as a reality and to arti culate
how it is functioning. Toward this end, this paper explores how the anti free riding
impulse has been a decisive, yet unstated, factor in many reported dilution cases.
A more controversial issue is whether the anti free riding impulse should be
treated as legitimate and turned into an independent cause of action, or whether it should
be debunked as a rogue and dangerous inclination. My position in this paper is that we
ought to embrace the impulse as a legitimate expression of the judicial desire to provide
expansive property rights for certain kinds of words. It has been said that law should
follow custom, not the other way around. There undoubtedly is a judicial custom of
punishing free riders in the trademark context. Judges appear eager to do this even when
the free riding is likely not harming the economic interests of the trademark owner – or,
at least in cases where proof of confusion and dilution is absent. They probably will
overbroad); Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 Iowa Law Review 732
(2003) (arguing that current dilution law wrongly allows owners of famous marks to extensively
collaterally license their marks and thereby self-dilute while still retaining anti-dilution protection against
others); Howard Shire, Dilution Versus Deception – Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate
Alternative to the Law of Infringement?, 77 Trademark Rep. 273 (1987) (arguing that dilution could
dangerously grant the owner of a distinctive mark a trademark nearly limitless property interests in the
mark, because if properly applied dilution prevents the use of a distinct famous mark in connection with
any type of goods or services other than those of the famous mark owner). The United States Supreme
Court has taken a similar approach it its recent decision in the Victoria’s Secret case. See Mosley v. Secret
Catalogue, Inc., supra note 3, 123 S. Ct. at 1124 (substantially narrowing the scope of federal dilution law
by holding that plaintiffs must show actual (as opposed to merely likely) dilution to prevail under the
federal act). On the other hand, some commentators have argued that dilution law does not go far enough
in protecting brand equity. See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. David, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose
Time Has Gone: Brand Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. Intell.Prop.L. 219
(1994) (arguing for explicit rights in brand equity going beyond antidilution law). The opposition to a
broad approach to dilution may be grounded, in part, in the fear that an expansive approach to language
ownership is likely to intrude too much on expressive freedom. This is not an idle fear. But it is an
unfocused fear. The problem is not with expansive language ownership per se; rather, it is with allowing
people to have broad control rights in language they did not invent. Unfortunately, current dilution law
permits exactly this wrong type of expansive ownership to occur. Here, I argue for a much broader (and
more coherent) approach to trade mark protection – but I would limit this broader protection to a narrower
class of words than currently are eligible for dilution protection. If, as I show, expansive protection is
given only for coined and quasi-coined words, there will be little risk of any significant intrusion on
expressive freedom. For a fuller treatment of this topic, see section VI, infra.
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continue to enforce this impulse regardless of the formal requirements of trademark law.
My thesis here is that they frequently are enforcing this impulse for good reasons. A
strong case can be made that free riding on a famous mark is unfair and economically
undesirable. The judicial inclination to punish free riding deserves respect and
refinement, not dismissive condemnation.
Having said that, however, I am mindful of the reasons why many courts and
commentators may be reluctant to recommend this broad form of trademark protection.
There may be a fear that a cause of action which prohibits free riding without any proof
of harm would be far too broad. Such a cause of action could be difficult to control, and
it might trample on other important interests of persons and companies that are searching
for new trademarks. In short, it may be far too unwieldy an instrument to place into the
hands of judges.
These are understandable fears, but ultimately they prove unfounded. For one
thing, this view assumes that current dilution law cabins the anti free riding impulse in a
meaningful way. I attempt to show here that this assumption is unwarranted. More
fundamentally, I show that it is possible to articulate meaningful limits on a free riding
cause of action without resort to dilution principles like blurring and tarnishment.5
Requiring a finding of economic harm to the famous mark is not the only way, or even
the best way, to limit the anti free riding impulse.6 I argue here that a more significant
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Blurring is the typical form of dilution. It means that a famous mark’s commercial magnetism will
become blurred, and therefore less capable of functioning as a strong brand identifier, if other companies
are allowed to use the same or a similar mark to sell a variety of unrelated goods. See McCarthy, supra
note 2, at § 24:68. Tarnishment is the other principal form of dilution. This refers to cases where
unauthorized uses of a famous mark tarnish its image by associating it with an unwholesome or lower
quality product. See id. at § 24:69. For a more complete discussion of these concepts, see section II, infra.
6
Indeed, a strong argument exists that the harm-based focus of dilution law is a proxy for deeper concerns
which are more accurately rooted in beliefs about language sharing and expressive freedom. These
interests may be thought too indefinite, however, to serve as determinate limits. Harm is thought more
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set of limits can be found by focusing on the language sharing and expressive freedom
interests of persons who wish touse marks that are identical or similar to famous marks.7
These interests need to be closely examined and carefully articulated. One can find some
effort in case law to locate precisely these kinds of limits. But the efforts have been
sporadic and vague. Part of my goal here is to bring this discussion out into the open as
well.
Nor are we completely without guidance or precedent in this effort. Some
European countries have a cause of action, explicitly denominated “unfair advantage,”
which enables judges to punish free-riding without resort to tortured reasoning about
alleged dilutive harm. This cause of action, which finds no direct counterpart in
American law, appears in most instances to be limited to situations where defendants
display a certain kind of “bad faith,” meaning they knowingly free-ride on another party’s
well-known mark. The European experience with the unfair advantage cause of action
provides a useful starting place for crafting an independent and explicit form of
protection against free riding in American trademark law.
But it is only a place to start our discussion. The Europeans have not done a
particularly good job of articulating why free riding is acceptable in some situations but
not in others. The project for American trademark scholars is to pick up where the
Europeans have left off. It should be possible to lay out a coherent theory of why free
riding is acceptable in some cases, but undesirable in others. It should also be possible to

certain. However, as I show below, harm itself is a vague and malleable concept in dilution law. It offers a
false sense of security as a limiting concept. It often operates as a mask for the true countervailing interests
that need to be considered. For a more complete discussion of this topic, see section VI, infra.
7
My claim here is that dilution law is at once too broad and too narrow. It offers too little (and too
uncertain) protection to too broad a category of words. It should offer a far simpler and more potent form
of protection to a much smaller set of words. The proposal advanced here would provide an expansive
property right for a more limited class of words. See sections VI and VIII, infra.
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identify a consistent set of limiting principles which can be used in new cases. In the
end, the result of this effort should yield a body of law that is at once more coherent and
intellectually honest than current dilution law
.
The remainder of this article is divided into eight parts. Part II provides an
historical overview of the development of dilution law in the United States. Part III
argues that the requirements of American dilution law are inherently indeterminate,
exceedingly difficult to prove, and if applied rigorously should result in few plaintiff
victories. Part IV seeks to explain the surprising plaintiff success rate in dilution cases as
a function of the anti free rider impulse. Part V argues that the anti free rider impulse
should be embraced, not eschewed, and that it can be grounded in a compelling “as
between” type of rationale. Part VI discusses how the proposed new cause of action
might be limited based on principles of language sharing and expressive freedom. Part
VII offers the European “unfair advantage” cause of action as a starting place for crafting
a new anti free riding cause of action in American law and discusses how that cause of
action should be modified to take account of the language sharing and expressive
freedom considerations discussed above. Part VIIII revisits the history of dilution law in
the United States and argues that the proposal advanced here captures the essence the
original dilution proposal as articulated in the 1920s, before dilution law took a wrong
turn to focus on harm. Part IX offers some concluding observations.
II.

Historical Overview of U.S. Dilution Law
Trademark law can be visualized as containing a core doctrine, often referred to

as the likelihood of confusion analysis, and a broader more expansive doctrine, often
referred to as dilution. The core doctrine, which comprised all of trademark law until the
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mid 1990s, allows trademark owners to prevent unauthorized parties from using a
trademark that is confusingly similar to the trademark owner’s mark.8 Under this
doctrine, for example, Kodak could prevent a rival camera company from selling Kodaka
cameras.
To prevail on such a claim, Kodak would have to show that consumers would be
likely to believe either that Kodaka cameras were manufactured by the original Kodak
Company or, at a minimum, that consumers were confused as to the affiliation or
association between the respective producers of products bearing the Kodak and Kodaka
marks. Trademark law does not tolerate such confusion, and it permits trademark owners
to stop it from occurring. The rationale for providing this type of protection is two-fold.
First, it prevents a company like Kodaka from committing a form of commercial
impersonation and defrauding consumers as to the source of goods.9 Second, it enables
the real Kodak Company to prevent a diversion of sales to an impostor.10
Prior to the adoption of dilution as a distinct doctrine in the United States,
trademark owners were confined to the likelihood of confusion analysis. Under that
analysis, only direct competitors could be liable for wrongfully using the established
trademark of another company.11 That rationale for the competitor limitation was simple:
absent competitive use, there was no injury. Kodak would not lose customers (and
thereby revenue) in the banana or bicycle business because it did not sell goods in those
industries.12 And without injury, there was no basis for recovery.
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For a general overview of the likelihood of confusion doctrine, see McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 23:1 –
§23:4.
9
See McCarthy, supra note 2, at §§ 2:7 and 2:9.
10
Id. at § 2:7
11
Id. at §24:1–§24:4.
12
Id. at § 24:4.
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This fairly restrictive approach to trademark law frustrated large corporations. As
their product lines grew and their marks because more famous, they clamored for more
protection.13 They thought it absurd that someone should be permitted to take a free-ride
on their name without any legal liability whatever. The notion that the trademark owner
simply had to tolerate this perceived dissipation of their intellectual property did not go
down easily.14
Courts responded to this pressure in various ways. Some relaxed the competitor
restriction to allow recovery even where the parties were not, strictly speaking,
competitors, but were in sufficiently “related” industries to surmise that competitive harm
was not remote.15 Others continued to apply the more restrictive approach. A resulting
tension existed in the commercial and legal communities.16 In short, given the
uncertainty of trademark law, one could never be too sure whether one could use a
famous trademark in a wholly unrelated field with immunity. And, on the other side of
things, owners of famous and well-established marks could not be too sure of the scope
of their legal protection.
The tension reached a boiling point in the mid 1920s, as the Industrial Revolution,
with its reliance on mass-production and the need for a coherent and expansive national
branding system, matured. In this context, a New York attorney named Frank Schechter
wrote a law review article entitled The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection.17
Schechter argued that the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis was too limited and
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Id. at § 24:5.
See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927).
15
See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 24:5.
16
Id.
17
See Schechter, supra note 14.
14
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unresponsive to modern commercial realities.18 He asserted that in the (then)
contemporary marketplace, trademarks performed far more than a mere sourceidentifying function.19 Their chief function was to form a psychological link between
consumers and producers.20 He spoke of the commercial magnetism of marks and argued
that this magnetism was a form of property, developed after valuable investment that
deserved broader protection than the likelihood of confusion test afforded.21
Schechter limited his proposal to famous marks that were either coined (entirely
made up words) or arbitrary (known words that were arbitrarily applied to products).22
He spoke repeatedly of the property interest than can attach to such marks.23 The
protectable property interest was the psychological bond between consumer and
producer. This was a bond or link which often was not based on any understanding by
the consumer of who ultimately made the goods. Thus, it was not a source-signifying
function, as such. But it was a function that deserved legal protection.
Schechter offered a mixed rationale for the expanded protection he proposed.
One strand of his thinking tended toward the property rationale.24 He believed that
famous distinct trademark were a form of intellectual property that belonged to those who
created the marks.25 Schechter suggested that strong trademarks deserved protection
from such exploitation in order to honor the investment in time and money that went into

18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 825-830. Schechter’s proposal applied only to coined, fanciful, or arbitrary marks, only to
situations in which the junior user’s mark was identical to that of the senior user, and only to use of
identical marks on noncompeting goods. See Schechter, supra note 14, at 825.
23
See Schechter, supra note 14, at 810
24
Id. at 823.
25
Id.
19
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making the mark strong.26 He believed it was wrong for others to exploit this value
regardless of whether the trademark owner was harmed in any way by the unauthorized
collateral use. Schechter wrote:
Quite apart from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use on other
goods … once a mark has come to indicate to the public a constant and uniform
source of satisfaction, its owner should be allowed the broadest scope possible for
`the natural expansion of his trade’ to other lines or fields of enterprise.27
Schechter recognized that in some situations another party’s use of a famous
trademark is not likely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods, and yet
protection still seems warranted. Assume, for example, that a company sells Kodak
bananas. Consumers are not likely to believe that these bananas originate from the same
company that sells Kodak cameras. Nor are they likely to assume that the camera maker
and the banana supplier are related or affiliated. The sale of Kodak bananas does not
involve the diversion of sales from Kodak, because Kodak is not in the banana business
and therefore cannot lose sales in that business. Still, in Schechter’s view, a banana
company should not be allowed to use the Kodak name to Bananas.28
Another strand of Schechter’s thinking tended toward the tort point of view. By
tort, I mean the desire to prevent injuries to a trademark owner (as opposed to the
property-based desire to give a trademark owner broad control over the use of a mark
without requiring proof of immanent harm).29 To justify his intuition that expanded

26

Id.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Tort, in this sense, is distinguished from a property rationale in trademark law. The tort rationale in
trademark law is rooted in its original purpose – the prevention of two particular types of harm. First,
trademark law aimed to prevent the diversion of sales from trademark owners to counterfeiters through
confusingly similar uses of the mark by the counterfeiters. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 24:2.
Second, trademark law sought to avoid a fraud-based injury to consumers who mistakenly purchased
counterfeit goods believing them to be the real thing. The property rationale, by contrast, refers to the
tendency of trademark law to respect an individual’s claim a word is exclusively hers in a broad range of
27
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trademark protection was warranted in certain circumstances, Schechter posited that mark
owners could be harmed in ways beyond the traditional harm of loosing one’s customers
due to the use of one’s mark by a competitor.30 The harm rationale was a supplement to
his property rationale. The chief harm he exposed was that of a gradual lessening of the
commercial magnetism of a mark if others were allowed to freely copy it in a variety of
non-competing products.31
Schechter never actually used the word “dilution.” Rather, he described a type of
harm (the gradual lessening the mark’s capacity to function as a strong mark) that later
came to be called dilution.32 In Schechter’s view, a famous mark’s strength could be
diminished in some way if other companies were allowed to use the same mark on
different types of goods. After a while, the famous mark will not be as capable of
cementing the bond between the original mark creator and the public. The mark owner
has a justifiable interest in preventing this type of harm from occurring before its
economic interests are irreparably injured. Schechter described the harm to be avoided as
the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods. The more
distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public
consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or
dissociation from the particular product in connection with which it has been
used.33

situations and to enforce her attempts to transfer her ownership interests in that word to others. For a
discussion of how trademark law has increasingly become more propertized in recent years, see David J.
Franklyn, Owning Words in Cyberspace: The Accidental Trademark Regime, 2001 Wisconsin Law
Review 1251 (2001). See also Lemley, supra note 4, at 1687, and Lunney, supra note 4 at 367.
30
Id. at 820.
31
Id.
32
See Nelson, supra note 4, at 754 and fn 145.
33
Id. at 825.
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It took some time for American legislatures to adopt the dilution cause of
action.34 Massachusetts was the first to do so in 1947.35 Other states followed suit,
adopting similar own anti- dilution acts. These acts largely followed the harm prong of
Schecter’s original dilution proposal. That is, they specified that expanded trademark
protection is available only in situations when the challenged use dilutes the selling
power of the plaintiff’s mark.36 And they tended to limit expanded protection to highly
distinct, strong trademarks.37
State law dilution acts were interpreted by judges to allow for injunctive relief in
two different types of cases. First, protection was extended upon proof that the plaintiff’s
mark was likely to suffer a lessening of the capacity of the mark to perform its sourceidentifying function.38 This type of harm is sometimes called dilution by “blurring,”
because the plaintiff’s mark is blurred in the mind of consumers due to the unrestrained
use of the same mark by other, unrelated companies.39 Alternatively, plaintiffs could
prevail by showing that the challenged use tarnished their reputation. This might occur
because the defendant was engaged in a shady business or made shoddy products. This
type of harm is sometimes called dilution by tarnishment.40
In the years immediately following the enactment of state anti dilution acts, state
court judges were reluctant to enforce their anti-dilution acts literally.41 Inexplicably,

34

For a discussion of historical developments between the time Schechter made his original anti dilution
proposal in 1927, and the adoption of the first anti dilution statutes by various States in the 1940s, see
Nelson, supra note 4, at 757-763.
35
See Act of May 2, 1947, 1947 Mass. Acts 300. For the current version of the statute, see Gen. Laws
Mass. Ch. 110B, § 12 (2000).
36
See Nelson, supra note 4, at 761- 763.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 763-765.
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they often required plaintiffs to show a likelihood of consumer confusion or competitive
injury.42 Judicial reluctance to fully enforce state anti-dilution statues gradually gave
way to a more expansive approach. State courts increasingly treated dilution as an
independent and potent cause of action.43 But trademark owners were not satisfied with
the level of protection offered by state statutes. Trademark owners lobbied hard for
federal anti dilution protection. They asserted that such protection was necessary to bring
uniformity to dilution law, to make federal courts an appropriate venue for dilution law
suits and to ensure that nationally famous marks enjoy a strong form of trademark
protection on a national level.44
Partly in response to the extensive lobbying efforts of trademark owners,
Congress finally adopted federal anti dilution protection in 1995. The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c),45 provides that
42

Id.
During roughly the same time period (the 1940-1960s), judges also expanded the likelihood of confusion
cause of action. Id. at 758. Originally, that cause of action was limited to direct competitors. Eventually,
it was expanded to include sellers of related goods. More significantly, judges expanded the concept of
confusion to include not only confusion as to source, but also confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation.
Congress picked up on this when it revised the federal Lanham Act in 1961 to assert liability for confusion
as to sponsorship or affiliation. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at §§ 23:8 and 24:2. This is significant
because it arguably rendered dilution law superfluous. Dilution was originally intended to fill the void
created by fact that the standard likelihood of confusion action was limited to competitors. The familiar
example is that the Kodak camera company could not enjoin the use of its name by a potato chip maker
since the two were not in competition and consumers were unlikely to assume that the chips came from the
camera maker (i.e., no source confusion). Dilution, it was thought, could remedy this problem by enabling
the camera maker to enjoin the chip maker on the ground that if there were many different Kodaks, the
name would be weakened as a trademark and this was a harm that the law would prevent. With the
expansion of the likelihood of confusion cause of action to include confusion as to sponsorship or
affiliation, however, it became much more possible for Kodak the camera maker to enjoin Kodak the chip
maker, on the theory that consumers might think the two companies were “affiliated.”
44
See Nelson, supra note 4, at 766.
45
The FTDA largely resembles its state-law counterparts, but it is different in at least three potentially
important respects. First, on its face the FTDA permits an injunction against dilutive uses of “famous”
marks. There is no language specifically or even impliedly prohibiting “tarnishing” uses. Arguably,
therefore, the federal act provides a cause of action only for dilution by blurring and not for dilution by
tarnishment. Second, the federal dilution cause of action is available only for “famous” marks. Most state
statutes, by contrast, protect famous or highly distinctive marks. Third, on its face, the FTDA states that
liability follows uses that “cause” dilution. Most of the state statutes impose liability for conduct that
causes or is “likely” to cause dilution. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that this difference
43
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[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable to an injunction against
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1). To establish a claim of dilution under the FTDA, a plaintiff
must demonstrate five elements: (1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) the senior mark
must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) the
junior use must begin after the senior mark becomes famous; and (5) the junior use must
cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark, by lessening the capacity of
the senior mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.46
The FTDA follows the harm rationale for expanded trademark protection.47 It
defines dilutive harm as trademark use which causes a “lessening the capacity of the
senior mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.”48 The harm imagined is
necessarily progressive. The progressive erosion contemplated by dilution theory has
been nicely explained by Professor McCarthy.49 He invites the reader to imagine a pure
class of crystal clear water into which is placed a single drop of blue die.50 That first

in terminology means that plaintiffs pursuing relief under the federal act must prove actual dilution; the
mere likelihood that dilutive harm may occur in the future is not enough. See Victoria’s Secret, supra note
3,123 S. Ct. at 1125.
46
See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 24.88. See also Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215
(2d Cir. 1999).
47
Recently the United States Supreme Court reinforced the harm-based focused of dilution law by ruling
that the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution as opposed to a mere likelihood that such dilution will
occur sometime in the future. This was a significant development in federal dilution law. It made it harder
to prove dilution in most cases. See Victoria’s Secret, supra note 3, 123 S. Ct. at 1125.
48
Although the FTDA does not expressly mention blurring or tarnishment, judges have it to enjoin both
kinds of dilution. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at §§ 24:93 and 24:104. The FTDA has also been used to
prevent cybersquatting. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at § 25:77.
49
See McCarthy, supra note 2 at §§ 24:67 and 24:68.
50
Id.

14

drop might not produce much change. But eventually, after a number of drops, the water
will turn a distinct form of blue. The more drops, the bluer it will get.
Dilution as a legal theory works in much the same way. The economic harm
envisioned by dilution has been described as a gradual “whittling away” of the
commercial magnetism or selling power of a famous and distinct trademark. No one
knows exactly when a trademark will be hurt due to multiple diluting uses of the same or
a highly similar mark by others.51 But dilution theory is premised on the notion that
eventually the famous mark will loose some of its selling power if multiple, unauthorized
uses of the mark are permitted to proceed.52
Until recently, the gradual erosion theory was reflected in dilution doctrine. An
aggrieved party could obtain injunctive relief by showing that a challenged use, if
permitted to continue, would eventually cause dilutive harm. Plaintiffs (in most
jurisdictions) had to show only that it was more likely than not that dilution would occur
at some point in the future if defendant and others were permitted to use a trademark that
is the same or highly similar to the plaintiff’s famous trademark.53 They did not have to
show actual harm.54
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected the likelihood of dilution
approach. In Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret, the Court ruled that plaintiffs must show
51

Id.
Id.
53
See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-25 (2nd Cir. 1999) (“we read [the FTDA] to
permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether at the instance of the senior user or the
junior seeking declaratory relief, before the dilution has actually occurred); accord, Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Natural Answers Inc., 223 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (where Seventh Circuit aligned itself with Second
Circuit’s finding that a “likelihood of dilution “ is sufficient to trigger dilution remedies under the federal
act). But see Ringling Bros. –Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel
Development, 170 F. 3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FTDA provides a remedy only for actual
dilution that has already begun to occur); accord, Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d
658 (5th Cir. 2000) (aligning itself with the Ringling Bros.’ actual dilution holding).
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actual dilution.55 The court reasoned that the FTDA, unlike its state law counterparts,
does not include language which explicitly makes likely dilution actionable.56 The FTDA
states that an injunction shall follow whenever the challenged use “causes” dilution.57
The Court ruled that this language means a plaintiff must prove that its mark has actually
begun to be diluted as a result of the defendant’s activities.58 Victoria’s Secret, then,
represents a sharpening of the harm focus in American dilution law.
III.

The Inherent Indeterminacy of Dilution Law
This article began with the assertion that the primary flaw in dilution doctrine lies

in the fact that dilution is vague and indeterminate, and that if it is taken seriously as a
concept, it is nearly impossible to prove. The section seeks to support that assertion.
The primary type of dilution is blurring. The notion here is that multiple uses of
the same mark on different types of products will eventually blur the distinctive character
of the famous trademark and cause it to lose some of its commercial magnetism and
selling power.59 The concept of blurring is complex. It assumes that a mark has a degree
of distinctiveness in the public consciousness and that this degree of distinctiveness can
be measured. It also assumes that multiple uses of the same trademark can blur that
distinctiveness in the public consciousness. This blurring occurs because consumers no
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See Victoria’s Secret, supra note 3, 123 S. Ct. at 1125.
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No one knows exactly what Victoria’s Secret means. See McCarthy, supra note 2 at § 24:110. For one
thing, the ruling seems inconsistent with the gradual erosion theory that lies at the heart of dilution law.
Moreover, the Court in Victoria’s Secret stated that proof of actual dilution does not necessarily entail
proof of current economic loss. Apparently, the court believes it is possible for a famous trademark to be
experiencing dilution even though the products to which it is attached are still just as profitable as they
were before the dilution began to occur. This is a strange and highly dubious assumption. If one is going
to require actual dilution, it would seem much more logical to conclude that this necessarily entails proof of
economic harm, as the Fourth Circuit concluded in the Ringling Bros.’ decision. See Ringling Bros., supra
note 53, 170 F.3d at 455.
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See McCarthy, supra note 2, at §§ 24:67 and 24:68.
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longer associate the famous mark with only one line of goods or only one source of
goods. Dilution theory further assumes that once blurring occurs, the blurred mark is less
capable of functioning as a strong source identifier for the company that originally
adopted that mark. Over time, this lessening of capacity to identify goods and services is
likely to weaken the brand and cause measurable financial loss to consumers.
For example, take the famous trademark Kodak, which is known primarily as the
brand name for a type of camera equipment. If other companies attempt to use Kodak as
their own mark for unrelated goods, such as bicycles or automobiles, dilution theory
would hold that these uses should be disallowed because they ultimately will weaken the
selling power of the original Kodak mark and thereby injure the commercial interests of
the owner of that mark. Dilution theory further holds that the owner of the Kodak mark
should be empowered to prevent dilution before it occurs.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is built on a series of curious and
ultimately dubious assumptions.60 First, it is not at all clear that the degree of
distinctiveness of a particular trademark can be accurately measured. Some marks are
more famous than others, but fame, alone, is not an indicator of mark strength. Mark
strength (which is what is often mean when one refers to mark distinctiveness) is a
slippery concept. Ultimately it refers to the ability of the mark to attract consumers’
attention in a complex and information-rich marketplace. It is difficult to know why
one’s goods sell well and why they do not. Positives sales activities may be more
60

See Id. at 24:100 (noting judicial skepticism about dilution by blurring); see also Middleton, Some
Reflections on Dilution, 42 Trademark Rep. 175, 187 (1952) (stating that as of 1952: “So far as I know no
[state law dilution case] case has turned on dilution alone”); Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark
Dilution and the Anti-dilution Statutes, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 439, 451 (1956) (raising doubts about dilution
theory); Welcowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 531, 583-88 (1991) (“Courts
are struggling to define a dilution theory and to distinguish it from [traditional trademark] infringement
when no real theory or distinction may exist . . . If legislatures cannot summon the will to repeal dilution
statutes, the statutes should be limited as much as their language will permit.”).
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associated with how one feels about a particular product than with a particular brand
name, per se.
Second, and for similar reasons, it is exceedingly difficult to measure any
reduction in mark distinctiveness. Absent clear proof that a particular brand is loosing
substantial sales, and that such loss is caused by the prevalence of other similar marks in
the marketplace, one could never really know whether dilution is occurring. But such
proof is hard to come by. In fact, in most dilution cases, the plaintiff sues before actual
economic harm has occurred. The plaintiff alleges that such harm is likely to occur if the
defendant is permitted to continue to sell similarly branded goods. And so the inquiry
shifts from whether dilution has occurred to whether it is likely to occur. It is even more
difficult to measure whether dilution is likely to occur than it is to measure whether it has
already occurred. This is so because the likelihood of dilution occurring in the future
necessarily entails a prediction about future events about which the court cannot hope to
know.
The indeterminacy of the predictive inquiry described above is exacerbated by the
fact that a judge will never know with any degree of certainty whether (and how many)
other companies are likely to start using a mark that is identical or similar to the
plaintiff’s famous mark. Nor will the judge be able to predict whether other future uses
of the same mark are likely to become pervasive. And yet the probability of a number of
other companies widely using the same or a similar mark is critical to the analysis. If
only this one defendant uses a mark that is similar to the defendant, then dilution is much
less likely to occur than if multiple parties use the same mark. For example, if only one
candy company uses the Kodak mark, and if that candy company operates at a fairly low
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level, dilution is considerably less likely to occur than if fifty different companies use the
Kodak mark on many different types of products and all fifty of them are well known.
Further compounding the analysis is the possibility that multiple uses of the same
or similar mark will not, in fact, materially lessen the strength or selling power of the
famous mark.61 There is scant empirical evidence that multiple uses of a famous mark
dilute the selling power of the mark in connection with the first class of products to which
it was attached.62 It takes a certain leap of faith to assume that multiple uses of a mark on
diverse products will necessarily or even usually or probably weaken a famous mark in
connection with either the first class of goods to which it was attached or even in
connection with the other classes of goods to which it was attached.63 Indeed, if dilution
were a real risk, famous mark owners would rarely, if ever, license their marks for use in
collateral markets on a variety of different types of goods. Yet this type of licensing
occurs frequently.64 This means that famous mark owners must assume that dilution by
blurring is not likely to occur merely because their mark is associated with a number of
different and diverse products.
IV.

The Hidden Interest in Dilution law: The Anti Free Rider Impulse
Given these inherent ambiguities in dilution law, it is surprising to see that

plaintiffs have been quite successful in obtaining injunctions in dilution cases.65 One
might have thought that plaintiffs would tend to lose dilution cases in all but the rare
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instance when their sales have measurably declined and they can show a clear causal
connection between that decline and the activities of the particular company that has been
using a mark that is identical or similar to the plaintiff’s mark. At a minimum, one would
have thought that judges would refuse to grant injunctions in dilution cases absent
compelling evidence showing that a host of companies were planning to use a mark that
is similar to the plaintiff’s mark and that if this allowed to proceed consumers would
indeed buy fewer of plaintiff’s products than they otherwise would have bought.
But this has not been the case. Plaintiffs frequently have won dilution cases with
little more than the assertion that plaintiff’s mark was famous before defendant began
using the same or a highly similar mark without any authorization from the plaintiff.66
Judges have been willing to enjoin such copycat uses of famous marks even when the
risk of dilution by blurring or tarnishment was nothing more than a mere possibility, and
not even a compelling one at that.
The reason for this phenomenon is that judges are most likely vindicating an
interest that is quite different than the interests that dilution law seeks to protect. The
hidden interest is a desire to punish free riding. There seems to be a basic conviction in
the human consciousness that free riding is wrong. This conviction is fairly simple and
straightforward and probably accounts for the plaintiff success rate in dilution cases.
Indeed, given the complexities and ambiguities of dilution theory, it is odd that trademark
law came to focus on dilutive harm as the exclusive or even dominant mechanism for
providing protection beyond the likelihood of confusion paradigm. This is particularly
odd when one considers that the anti free impulse provides us with a much simpler and
more compelling rationale for protection famous trademarks.
66

See id.
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One can think of numerous instances where a trademark ought to be protected
despite the absence of dilutive harm. Take, for example, the famous trademark Google.
It is the name of a popular internet search engine web site. Suppose I want to sell Google
candy bars without Google’s permission. Should it be allowed?67 The traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis probably would not provide Google with relief. It is
doubtful anyone would conclude that Google candy bars were manufactured by the
search engine company. Most of us are not aware of a search engine company being in
the candy business. We would not be confused into buying the candy bars on the
mistaken assumption that they came from the same company that provides excellent
search engine services.
And yet my stronghunch is that most people would say Google (the search engine
company) deserves protection in this instance. If you asked them to give a reason why,
99% of them (excluding trademark lawyers) would provide a rationale that has absolutely
nothing to do with dilution. I have conducted an informal survey of this type. I always
get the same basic answer. People feel strongly that Google is the property of the internet
search company and that a candy company called Google would be attempting unfairly to
poach or trade off of the good reputation of the search engine company. People generally
feel this type of “free riding” is wrong. They may not be able to explain why, but their
intuitions rarely comport with anything that resembles dilution theory.
When confronted with this hypothetical, the dilution argument does not naturally
come to mind. It is one of those rare, exotic things invented by lawyers. It is not that a
67

For a similar case currently in litigation, see Xtraplus Corp. v. Google, Inc., Case Number C-01-20425
(No. Dist. Calif. 2003).
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case for dilution cannot be made; it is just that it is not the natural and most
straightforward case to make. Indeed, the notion that the Google mark would be diluted
by the use of the same mark on candy bars seems far fetched. It is difficult to imagine the
Google mark loosing fame or credibility in the search engine industry because of the use
of the same or a similar mark in other industries. The risk of harm from blurring seems
remote at best. It is possible that the tarnishment type of harm could occur if the Google
mark was associated with an unsavory business practice, but even this type of harm
seems highly speculative. In any event, the possibility of any such harm occurring
seems to be a much weaker and more tenuous rationale for providing Google with relief
than the basic anti-free riding rationale.
The truth is that dilution law – as actually practiced and applied by judges -- hews
more closely to the anti free riding rationale than to the dilution rationale. An empirical
review of the case law seems to bear out the notion that judges are just as likely as lay
persons to conclude that free riding is wrong in and of itself, and that dilution, as such, is
largely beside the point. Below I discuss four dilution cases to illustrate this
phenomenon.68
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I discuss four illustrative cases in this section. There have been many, many other cases in which dilution
has been used to punish free-riding. In all of these cases, the risk of dilutive harm has been remote but free
riding was obvious. See, e.g., Nikon v. Ikon Photographic Corp., 987 F.2d 91 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“Ikon”
dilutes “Nikon”); McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“McBagel’s”
dilutes “McDonald’s”); Cynthia Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.
1963) (“Polaraid” dilute “Polaroid”); Toys R Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kidie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Kids ‘r’ Us” dilutes “Toys R Us”); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,. 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7965, 16 U.S. P.Q.2d 1275 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Wing-Flings” dilutes “Wing-Dings”). Indeed,
courts in a number of cases have been quite clear in explicitly identifying free riding as the gist of the
dilution cause of action. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that
dilution is about preventing free riding on mark owners’ substantial investment in famous marks); Playboy
Enters. V. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,
50 (1st Cir. 1998) (dilution protects trademark owners “from an appropriation of or free riding on” the
substantial investment that they have made in their marks). The desire to funnel all manner of anti free
riding anger into the dilution molds is not limited to decided cases; to the contrary, one can see numerous
examples of it in pending litigation. Recently, for example, Fox News Channel sued Al Franken, the
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1. Victoria’s Secret
One need not look far to find a compelling example of the anti free rider impulse
at work in dilution law. In the very recent Victoria’s Secret case, which eventually made
its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, both lower courts were willing to enjoin the
defendant’s use of a mark which was similar to plaintiffs because they clearly saw the
defendant as a free rider.69 They were willing to entire the injunction even the absence of
any type of clear evidence whatever that dilution was likely to occur.
In Victoria’s Secret, plaintiff owned the famous trademark “Victoria’s Secret” for
use on women’s lingerie and apparel.70 It sued a Lexington Kentucky retail store which
called itself “Victor’s Secret.” Victor’s Secret sold a variety of things, including a slight
amount of sexy women’s lingerie and a slightly larger amount of sex toys.71 Victor’s
Secret changed its name to “Victor’s Little Secret,” after receiving a cease and desist
letter from Victoria’s Secret’s lawyers.72 The nationally famous plaintiff was not
impressed with this slight name change, and promptly brought suit in federal court for
garden-variety trademark infringement and dilution. The district court and Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal both sided with plaintiff on the dilution claim.73 Eventually, the United

former Saturday Night Live comedian, for placing on the bottom of the front cover of his new book the
phrase “Balanced and Fair” -- a phrase which Fox previously registered as a trademark. Fox candidly
admits that the essence of its suit is that Franken is attempting to exploit the fame a phrase that Fox
allegedly made famous. This suit raises serious issues about language sharing and the proper boundaries of
any cause of action that seeks to vindicate the anti free riding impulse. See section VI, below.
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See Victoria’s Secret, supra note 3, 123 S. Ct. at 1125.
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States Supreme Court overturned the decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.74
The lower court decisions in Victoria’s Secret provide clear examples of the antifree-rider impulse at work. The possibility that the use of Victor’s Secret could dilute
Victoria’s Secret was remote. Victor’s Little Secret was a small operation in a small
Kentucky town. The location of its store, nature of its business and look and feel of its
operation all precluded consumers from assuming that it had any connection with the
plaintiff. There was no proof that Victoria’s Secret had lost its luster as a trademark.
However, Victor’s Secret was free-riding on Victoria’s Secret name. In these
circumstances, it did not really matter to either the district court or the appellate court that
the possibility of dilutive harm (i.e., blurring or tarnishment) was remote. There was
free-riding. That was all that mattered.
2. The Wawa case
Another example of how dilution rhetoric can serve as a malleable vehicle for the
anti-free-riding impulse is found in WAWA v. Haaf.75 In Wawa, plaintiff owned a
successful and prominent chain of convenience stores in Pennsylvania and surrounding

74

The Supreme Court reversed after finding that the FTDA requires proof of actual as opposed to merely
likely dilution. Because the law was not clear on this point prior to the Court’s ruling, the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Undoubtedly, the Court’s ruling makes it
harder to prove dilution and it makes the dilution cause of action less susceptible to use as a general antifree-rider statute. The Court understandably wanted to limit dilution, probably because of its own
perception that an unlimited anti-free-riding statute was a bad thing. As I show more fully below, the Court
got it wrong. The free-riding impulse should be limited. But not by a strict focus on harm. If, as I
contend, the impulse has deep and compelling theoretical justification, then it is likely that the impulse will
simply find its expression elsewhere in trademark law. Perhaps lower court judges will further stretch the
likelihood of confusion analysis to punish free riders. Perhaps they will ignore parts of Victoria’s Secret or
confine it to its facts or find a way to wiggle around it. But they are not likely to simply abandon the desire
to punish free riders. See section V, infra.
75
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areas.76 Defendants, apparently wishing to trade on defendant’s fame, started a single
convenience store called HAHA.77 Plaintiff sued defendants on several grounds, but
ultimately proceeded on a dilution theory alone.78 Plaintiffs contended that the seller
power of the Wawa name was being undermined and diluted by defendant’s use of Haha
as a similar name for a convenience store.79 They produced no proof of actual harm.
Defendants explained that they picked the HAHA name because it was similar to
their family name, Haaf.80 The district judge would have none of it. In issuing an
injunction, he reasoned that “[a]lthough Mr. Haaf denies predatory intent, I am
dubious.”81 The court thought there was a “parody problem” in defendant’s use, which,
when combined with the fact that defendant’s HAHA mark was itself distinctive and easy
to remember, made it likely that plaintiff’s famous Wawa mark would be “blurred” in the
minds of consumers.82
The court never stopped to explain why such blurring was likely. Plaintiff offered
a survey showing that some twenty nine percent of respondents thought of plaintiff’s
business when encountering defendant’s name (on the survey form).83 But neither the
parties nor the court explained why this mere association was likely to “blur” the
distinctiveness of plaintiff’s mark.
The opinion can only be explained as an expression of the anti-free-riding
impulse. Indeed, the court almost acknowledges as much when it focuses on “predatory
intent.” Such intent, strictly speaking, ought to be irrelevant to the dilution inquiry.
76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
77

25

Dilution is about likely effects – i.e., the probability that numerous uses of a famous mark
will diminish its selling power. It is not supposed to be about predatory intent. Yet
courts, as here, often talk of such intent in dilution opinions. This fact alone illustrates
that they are as concerned about preventing free-riding as they are about preventing any
sort of harm to a mark. The court’s decision in Wawa honestly acknowledges the freeriding factor.84
3. Lexington Management Corporation v. Lexington Capital Partners
The primacy of the anti-free riding impulse is also evident in the court’s opinion
in the case of Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners.85 There, the
plaintiff, a 401(k) fund manager, sued defendant, a retail securities broker for traditional
trademark infringement and dilution due to defendant’s use of the “Lexington” name in
the financial services industry.86 There was no evidence of actual confusion and little
possibility of any shared customers between the two companies – plaintiff dealt mainly
with institutional investors as a mutual fund manager, whereas defendant dealt with retail
investors.87
Plaintiff presented no evidence that its mark was famous nationally or in the
financial services industry in particular. Nor did it explain how defendant’s use of the
word “Lexington” in its own name could dilute the selling power of plaintiff’s mark.
Indeed, such dilution was highly unlikely given the fact, as defendant asserted, that over
3,400 businesses were already using the Lexington mark nationally in one business or
another, and that several of those uses related to financial services.
84
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On these facts, the court nevertheless ruled for the plaintiff, on both its likelihood
of confusion and dilution causes of action. While the court stated that there was no firm
evidence that defendant acted in “bad faith” in selecting the Lexington name,
“defendant’s strong and widespread presence in the investment market and press makes it
unlikely that defendant could not have known of plaintiff’s business and trademark
rights.”88 The court also noted that whereas plaintiff began using the Lexington mark in
the mid 1980s, defendant did not include Lexington in its name until 1997. Prior to that
time, defendant was called First Hanover Securities.89 In these circumstances, the court
apparently believed that defendant was attempting to capitalize inappropriately on
plaintiff’s existing reputation generally in the financial services industry. Based on this
belief, the court was willing to enjoin defendant from using the Lexington mark in any
manner whatsoever – despite the lack of evidence of dilutive harm.
4. Times Mirror Magazine v. Las Vegas Sports News
In Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News,90 plaintiff was the
owner of the trademark “Sporting News,” which had been used as the name of as a sports
magazine name since 1886.91 Plaintiff’s magazine provided its readers with information
on baseball, basketball, football and hockey, and had a weekly circulation of
approximately 540,000 customers in the United States.92
Defendant originally published a gambling news magazine in Las Vegas under
the name “Las Vegas Sports News,” but changed its name in 1997 to “Las Vegas
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Sporting News,” in an effort to boost sales.93 Defendant’s magazine contained articles,
editorials and advertisements on sports wagering for “the sports gaming enthusiast.”94
Plaintiff sued defendant solely on a dilution theory. The district court found for
plaintiff and the Third Circuit affirmed.95 The appellate court found that the plaintiff’s
mark was sufficiently famous in its “niche market” to qualify for protection under the
FTDA. The Court also found that defendant’s use was likely to blur the distinctiveness
of plaintiff’s mark in the mind of consumers.96
The Court’s ruling cannot be explained on a dilution rationale. There was no
evidence that purchasers of plaintiff’s magazine had come to associate plaintiff’s mark
with gaming; nor was there a serious risk that that would occur in the future. Rather,
both the district and appellate courts seemed genuinely troubled by the fact that defendant
clearly had attempted to take a free-ride on the superior notoriety and good reputation of
plaintiff’s publication.97
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The use of dilution law to punish free riders in the absence of blurring or tarnishment can also be seen in
the early cyber squatter cases. Prior to the adoption of the federal Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act
(“ACPA”) in 1999, cybersquatting claims were usually funneled into the dilution mold. It was a poor fit.
Judges did not like cybersquatting. They clearly thought it a form of free-riding that should be stopped.
They therefore found little difficulty in stretching standard dilution law to achieve that end. One of the first
instances of cybersquatting to be enjoined under the FTDA was Intermatic v. Toeppen. Mr. Toeppen had
reserved hundreds of famous trademarks as internet domain names before the trademark owners could do
so. The district court court granted summary judgment against Toeppen on the dilution count. The result in
Toeppen cannot be squared with the theory of dilution or the wording of the FTDA. Toeppen did not dilute
the selling power of the Panavision trademark through blurring or tarnishment. It is probable that the
judges were convinced that Mr. Toeppen was attempting to reap where he had not sown. He was a classic
free-rider.
The impulse to punish free-riding in the cybersquatting context is not limited to the judicial arena.
The ACPA itself is a legislative expression of the anti-free-riding impulse. Because some judges thought it
intellectually dishonest to punish cybersquatting through the dilution cause of action, they refused to enjoin
activity that clearly counted as free-riding. Congress eventually elevated the anti-free-riding impulse to a
statutory cause of action in the ACPA. Courts increasingly are interpreting the ACPA to punish free riding
whenever the defendant has used a famous mark as part of its domain name with knowledge of the mark’s
fame. See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 679 (E.D. Va.
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V.

Toward a More Coherent Theory of the Anti Free Rider Impulse
In the foregoing section, I tried to show that judges frequently use dilution law as

a mechanism for vindicating the anti-free riding impulse, even when dilutive harm is
remote. Even accepting that this is true, there are two possible responses to this
phenomenon. One could conclude that the judicial inclination to punish free riding
through the malleable vehicle of dilution law is wrong and should be stopped. Perhaps
this is one reason the United States Supreme Court recently attempted to rein in federal
dilution with the new requirement that plaintiffs prove actual dilution.98 On this view, the
problem is not with the harm requirement, as such, but rather with how slippery it has
been and how easy it has been to avoid. The remedy, if one accepts this approach, is to
make harm a more central and meaningful component of dilution law. In this way, the
judicial tendency to vindicate the anti free rider impulse in cases where dilution is highly
unlikely might be minimized.
Another possible approach – and the one I advance here -- is to embrace the anti
free rider impulse as a legitimate basis for an independent form of trademark protection.
My thesis in this article is that the anti free rider impulse should be embraced and turned
into a separate form of trademark protection. This thesis ultimately is grounded in the
notion that dilution does not provide the most natural rationale for why one might wish to
protect famous marks against free riders and that judges may properly enjoin free riding
for reasons that have little to do with dilution per se. In the paragraphs that follow, I
offer a theoretical construct which might be used as the basis for anti free riding
legislation that does not rely on traditional dilution principles like blurring and
2001)(granting summary judgment against cyber squatter largely due to the anti free rider impulse, where
bad faith arguably should have been a triable issue of fact); see also Xtraplus Corp., surpa note 67, at p. 13.
98
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tarnishment. I first lay out the basic justifications for preventing free riding on famous
marks. I then apply those justifications in the context of a hypothetical case.
A.

Justifying the Anti Free Rider Impulse

The anti free rider cause of action in trademark law finds its strongest justification
in a blended rationale that focuses on the respective rights and interests of the famous
mark creator and the party who wishes to knowingly exploit that mark for clear
commercial gain. Because the justification process is necessarily contextual, I refer to it
an “as between” type of argument. That is, as between the famous mark owner, who
frequently expends some time, effort and money to create and maintain the mark’s fame,
and a third party who did nothing to create that fame but nevertheless wishes to exploit it,
we generally have no trouble siding with the famous mark owner. The intuition here is
based on a vague and often unarticulated but still defensible sense of the equities of the
situation.
On the one side, we consider the interests of the mark owner. The mark owner
gets credit for selecting a catchy word or phrase as a mark and for investing time, money
and energy to make the mark famous. Fame does not usually come to a mark overnight
or by accident. It takes planning and considerable economic investment to make most
marks famous. We feel that that investment generally deserves protection. We also
believe that the famous mark creator should be allowed to capture the full economic
rewards of her investment and to control how her investment is utilized. In disputes with
free riders, that usually means requiring the free rider to obtain some sort of license from
the mark owner.
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When examined more closely, these basic intuitions about the interests of the
famous mark owner appear to be grounded in a multi-faceted rationale. One strand of the
rationale relies partly on the labor theory of property rights. Intellectual property rights
(outside the trademark context) have long been justified in part by the labor theory of
property.99 The notion here is that one deserves to own the fruits of one’s labor.100 John
Locke posited that if a human being can be said to own her own body, it follows that she
should own the fruits of her body’s labors.101 This means that the laborer has a superior
right to control the fruits of her labor and to capture benefits which those labors might
generate.102 As applied here, Lockean labor theory supports our intuition that famous
mark owners deserve to own and control marks which they made famous and to capture
the economic benefits that they generate.103
The other strand of the “as between” rationale finds support in economic incentive
theory.104 Lurking in the “as between” rationale is a set of economic assumptions about
optimal mark investment. One assumption is that free riding prevents a famous mark
owner from capturing the full financial benefits of her mark. This appears to be a valid
assumption. If a company knows it can license its famous and highly distinct marks in all
fields – even to those who wish to use the mark on totally unrelated types of goods – it
will have a strong incentive to create a famous mark. Economists might refer to this as
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internalizing the benefits of creating a famous name.105 The famous mark owner is in the
best position to decide to whom the mark should be licensed and to ensure that the mark
is utilized in the most efficient and economically desirable manner. Uncontrolled free
riding thus provides a drain on the optimal use of prestigious marks.
It is important to note that considerations of harm – even dilutive harm – are not
necessarily wholly absent from how we view the potential property interests of the
famous mark owner. It is possible that lurking in the background of the judicial (or lay)
imagination is a feeling that uncontrolled use of a famous mark could eventually hurt the
mark owner is some way. (Just as it is possible that lurking in the background of real
property protection is some vague notion trespass to property could harm the property
owner in some way.)106 Whether the harm could come in the form of “tarnishment” or
“blurring” or even in some other sense is not particularly clear. But we are not troubled
by that lack of clarity, because the immanency or likelihood of harm is not paramount -or even necessary to -- the “as between” analysis. The gist of that analysis is that the
famous mark owner created something of value, and that as between her and the third
party user, the former should be able to control the famous mark.
On the other side of the equation, we evaluate the interests of the person who
wishes to use a mark that is identical or highly similar to a famous mark. Here we often
find little to commend the would-be famous mark user/emulator. Her motive frequently
is clear: she selected the mark in question because of its similarity to a famous mark.
We are likely to conclude that she must have known what she was doing, even in the
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absence of clear proof, because of the fame of the mark she has attempted to copy.107
One would have to be cloistered not to know what one was doing in most of these cases.
The attempt to make a profit off of some one else’s fame troubles us. There
seems to be something unseemly about this type of profiteering. Our concern here is
precisely the opposite of the intuition that underlies our sympathy with the famous mark
owner. There we felt that the mark owner deserved to control her mark because she
created it and made it famous. Here, on the other hand, we see someone trying to exploit
fame they did not create. They are trying to obtain credit for a something they did not
earn. This attempted exploitation appears to be a form of unearned advantage seeking that
troubles us. In the words of the metaphor, we believe that one is attempting to reap
where one has not sown. At bottom, the conduct is seen as a type of theft, and as such, it
is adjudged to be morally wrong.
Our moral condemnation is intensified by the fact thatin many instances we
cannot identify any kind of justification for free riding on famous trademarks. The free
rider usually did not need to use the famous mark. Nor can we see any benefit to
allowing her to use it. There does not seem to be any collective gain from allowing such
free-riding to occur. Unlike other areas of intellectual property law, free-riding on a
famous trademark does not further innovation or technological advancement.108 Thus,
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whileunrestrained free-riding on famous marks imposes impediments to optimal mark
investment, it also appears to provide no countervailing economic benefit to society.
A final point to notice about the “as between” rationale is that it does not wholly
depend on the strength of any one of the strands that comprise it. That is, we are still
persuaded of its overall viability despite the fact that in an individual case one element of
the rationale does not seem to provide support for a mark owner.109 For example, in
some instances, it may be doubtful that a particular mark owner did much to make her
mark famous (and thus Lockean labor theory alone would not support her property
claim). In other cases, we might doubt that a particular famous mark owner would really
wish to license her mark broadly or that anybody would really pay her money to use the
mark in such unrelated industries (and thus economic incentive theory alone might not
support her property claim). In still other instances, we might be quite doubtful that the
accused use is likely to harm the mark owner in any clear way110 (and thus dilution theory
alone might not support her property claim).
The reason why such individually weak elements do no necessarily defeat the as
between rationale is because it is alwaysa comparative analysis. 111 The plaintiff may
have a relatively weak property claim, but the defendant often has no justification
whatsoever for her free riding. We are willing to give the plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt on how much labor or money she expended to make her mark famous or on how
important the lost licensing fee is to her because we can see no compelling benefit that
comes from the defendant’s free riding. In the end, it is a question of control. We
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believe that the famous mark owner should be the one to decide whether she is threatened
by third party use or can capture a financial benefit that her famous mark made
possible.112
To summarize, then, the anti free riding impulse appears to be embedded in a
crude and unarticulated cost/benefit analysis. On the property side, it relies on vague
notions about the degree of labor and monetary investment (initial mark selection,
continued advertising, marketing efforts and the like) that go into making a mark famous.
It concludes that this investment deserves protection as a general matter – to enable the
mark owner to capture the full economic benefit of the fame she created and to control
against potentially harmful uses by others. On the free riding side, it generally assumes
that the third party had improper motives; that the conduct was morally reprehensible;
and that free riding on famous marks does not provide any social or economic benefit.
112
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Finally, because the defendant’s interests in such cases are often so weak, we generally
are inclined to give plaintiffs considerable latitude in protecting their famous marks.
B.

Illustrating the “As Between” Rationale

It may be useful to return to our Google hypothetical to explore the contours of
the as between rationale in the context of a concrete factual scenario. There, we
supposed that the Google name was used without permission by a candy company and we
asked whether this should be allowed. Employing the as between analysis, we see that
the founders of the Google search engine company have invested substantial time, money
and effort to make the Google brand a valuable commodity.
The selection of the Google name also apparently entailed some degree of
creativity. Google does not readily spring to mind as a suitable or natural name for a
search engine company. Picking the name undoubtedly involved a prior search to make
sure it was not similar to the name of any other search engine company. Indeed, the
Google name appears to have been derived from the word “googol,” which signifies the
number one followed by a hundred zeros. Perhaps the implication was that the google
search engine has a search capacity that is at least as large as this huge number. This
combination of creativity in selection and monetary investment in advertising to make the
mark famous counsel in favor of granting the Google mark owners a strong property
right.
On the other side of the equation, we analyze the interests of the company that
wishes to use Google as a name for candy. There is a strong presumption that the candy
company is operating with full knowledge of Google’s fame as a search engine trademark
and that it is attempting to exploit that fame. There also does not appear to be any
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justification for allowing the candy company to do so. There are an almost limitless
number of names that would be equally as good for the candy company (if one puts aside
the advantage they are attempting to gain by capitalizing off of Google’s fame). And
they have no particular reason why the google name in any way uniquely suits their
particular product or is necessary for them to effectively compete in the candy business.
In these circumstances, we are justifiably inclined to find for Google. Our
conviction is based first and foremost on our reasonable conclusion that the founders of
google have certain investment-backed expectations and that those expectations deserve
legal protection. Our conviction is also based on the fact that the candy company has no
apparent reason for free riding on the fame that Google created. Lurking in the back of
our minds may be a concern that failing to protect Google could subject google to some
type of harm.
We may be justifiably concerned that if Google loses control over its mark, others
might be able to use the mark in ways that could wash back on the search engine
company to its detriment. But we are not compelled to find that such harm has already
begun to occur. Nor do we feel that Google must prove that it is more likely than not that
such harm will occur in the immediate future. Our desire to provide Google with
sufficient control to prevent such harm is grounded in a more basic sense that free riding
is wrong in this situation and that Google has a right to control the use of this particular
name. In short, we have no difficulty in deferring to Google as the entity best situated to
decide whether another party’s use of its name is likely to harm it in the future.
We also are inclined to allow Google to decide whether this is a particular use it
wants to license. We believe Google has a superior interest in capturing collateral
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licensing fees from the use of its name. Whether it actually would be willing to license
its mark to this particular candy company is largely beside the point. Again, when we
compare Google’s investment in its name to the utter lack of justification for the candy
company’s actions, we are justifiably inclined to allow Google to decide whether
licensing its mark is in its best interest in this situation.
To summarize, then, in this section I have demonstrated that there are good
reasons to vindicate the anti free riding impulse in trademark law and that those reasons
are only remotely related to considerations of traditional dilution concepts like blurring
and tarnishment. I have argued that broad protection for famous marks can be grounded
most convincingly in an “as between” type of argue that compares the investment of the
mark owner to the justifications, if any, for free riding. When such justifications are
lacking, we are right to conclude that the trademark owner should prevail.
VI.

Finding Limits
Having sought to justify the basic impulse that causes judges to enjoin free riding

in the trademark context and to locate that impulse as a component in a multi-faceted
analysis, I am not unmindful of the reasons why many courts and commentators may be
reluctant to recommend this broad form of trademark protection. There may be a fear
that a cause of action which prohibits free riding without any proof of clear and definable
types of harm (such as blurring and tarnishment purport to be) would be far too broad.113
Such a cause of action could be difficult to control, and it might trample on other
important interests of persons and companies that are searching for new trademarks. In
short, it may be far too unwieldy an instrument to place into the hands of judges.
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These are legitimate fears, but they are largely unfocused. For one thing, this
view assumes that current dilution law cabins the anti free riding impulse in a meaningful
way. As I have shown above, dilution law has not offered an effective set of mechanisms
to limit the anti free riding impulse.114 The focus on harm as a limit has superficial
appeal, but this appeal dissipates once one realizes how speculative and indeterminate
dilutive harm is. Courts have not done a particularly good job in applying dilution in a
way that would make it a coherent and predictable – and thus well-bounded – concept.115
More fundamentally, it ought to be possible to articulate meaningful limits on a
free riding cause of action without resort to dilution principles like blurring and
tarnishment.116 Requiring a finding of economic harm to the famous mark is not
necessarily the only way, or even the best way, to limit the anti free riding impulse.117
As I show below, a more significant set of limits can be found by focusing on the
language sharing and expressive freedom interests of persons who wish to use marks that
are identical or similar to famous marks.118
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A.

Starting with a Hypothetical Case

As we have seen, dilution is not the most natural and compelling rationale for
providing anti free riding protection to famous marks. It is also not the most natural
mechanism for articulating effective and meaningful limits on the free riding concept.
One can think of instances where free riding on a famous mark seems justifiable, but not
because that free riding is unlikely to dilute the selling power of the famous mark. Take,
for example, the famous trademark Amazon.com. As we all know, that mark is used to
sell a host of on-line products, the main bulk of which are books. Suppose someone
decides to name their jungle expedition travel agency “Amazon Travel.” Should this be
allowed?
I suspect that most people would answer this question in the affirmative. But,
again, their assessment would have little, if anything, to do with the standard dilution law.
Again, my point here is not that a non-dilution rationale could not be constructed.
Rather, my point is that dilution is an unnatural and largely unnecessary analytical tool in
this context. It is much more likely that people would think Amazon Travel ought to be
allowed to utilize the word Amazon as part of their own name because the word Amazon
was not invented by the owners of Amazon.com and because Amazon is the name of a
jungle river and thus somehow linked to the nature of the travel agency’s business. In
short, people would intuitively conclude that Amazon.com’s property interests are
relatively weak and that the travel agency’s reasons for using the Amazon name are
strong. Indeed, they may even be inclined to stick to this analysis in the face of evidence
that the travel agency selected Amazon as part of its name in part because of the
popularity of Amazon.com.
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By contrast, in the earlier Google hypothetical, where we imagined a candy
company calling itself Google Candy, we were strongly inclined to protect the famous
mark owner. This intuition probably was grounded largely in our sense that Google is a
strange and quirky name carefully selected by the Google search engine company and our
sense that the candy company had no business-related reason to use Google as part of its
name (aside from the obvious free-riding profit-seeking reason).
The different intuitive reactions to the Amazon.com hypothetical (where free
riding seems acceptable) and the Google hypothetical (where free riding seems
unacceptable) are due to the nature of the famous mark involved in each case, and the
reasons why the other partywas using a mark which was identical or similar to the
famous mark. I explore each of these factors in greater detail below.
B. The Nature of the Famous Mark
The most significant limit on the free riding impulse relates, not to the possibility
of dilutive harm, but rather to the nature of the famous mark for which protection is
sought. The more the famous mark appears to be an invented, coined or made up word,
the more inclined we are to protect it against any and all free riding. The more it appears
to be a common, descriptive or already existing word, the less we are inclined to protect it
against any and all free riding. This inclination is based, in part, on our collective notions
of labor and reward. We have inherited the general Lockean notion that the reward of
property should follow some type of expenditure of labor. 119 We are not inclined to give
people strong property rights when they expend little or no effort in creating something of
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chapter V, 27.
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value. By contrast, we are inclined to give relatively greater property rights to people
who expend labor to invent new things.
Patent law and copyright law are prime examples of how both inclinations have
been used to construct broad sets of intellectual property rights.120 Trademark law is not
usually thought to rest on Lockean labor theory.121 But it does.122 This is just another
example of the labor instinct at work. It takes a degree of intellectual labor and creativity
to invent a new word for use as a trademark and to then make that invented mark famous.
By contrast, it takes relatively little effort to simply pluck an existing word from the
known and obvious lexicon of existing words and to then make that word famous. In
short, we are inclined to believe that the invented word somehow belongs to its creator in
a way that does not necessarily apply to the plucked word.
C. Language Sharing
The second reason why we are inclined to protect Google but not Amazon in
these hypothetical cases is because of the language sharing interests of the alleged free
rider. We can see how one might have a good reason to call one’s jungle travel agency
Amazon Travel. Amazon is a common word that existed and had a real world meaning
(it is the name of a South American river) before Amazon.com made it famous for on120

See Hughes, 77 Geo. L.J. at 319-340.
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The basic “Abercrombie continuum”—which runs through all of trademark law -- purports to offer a
sliding scale of rights to trademark owners based on the nature of a particular mark. Ranging from
strongest to weakest, the continuum divides all verbal symbols into either fanciful, arbitrary, suggestion,
descriptive or generic words. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at §§ 11:1 – 11:25 (detailing Abercrombie
continuum of mark distinctiveness). The continuum gives stronger rights to entirely made up words.
Generic and common words receive little or no protection. The common rationale for these distinctions is
that made up words are more capable of distinguishing goods and services in commerce and thus deserve
more protection. See id at § 11:1. But surely this cannot be the totality of it. Is seems equally if not more
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line book sales. A jungle travel agency can, therefore, reasonably claim part of its reason
for naming itself Amazon Travel is to tap into this pre-existing meaning. We are inclined
to sympathize with this type of choice because we generally believe that all people should
have an equal right to use common pre-existing words so long as they do not thereby
harm others.123 In this situation, the travel agency seems to have a natural and
compelling reason for sharing in the use of the Amazon name.
By contrast, we are not inclined to embrace a similar language sharing rationale to
justify the use of Google by a candy company. The word “google” appears to most
people to be highly unusual and basically meaningless. In fact it was derived by Google,
from the obscure mathematical word “googol,” which designates the number one with a
hundred zeros after it.124 In any event, the hypothetical candy company clearly is not
tapping into any preexisting and arguably shared meaning of the word googol. As such,
it has no language sharing interests which even arguably could trump the property
interests of Google, Inc.
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It should be noted that there is a relationship between the first limiting principle
mentioned above (which focuses on the inventiveness of the famous mark) and the
second limiting principle (which focuses on the language sharing interests of the alleged
free rider). The more invented a word is the less likely that depriving other trademark
users entirely of its use will result in any prejudice or harm to their language sharing
rights. If a word is completely made up and none of its constituent parts is comprised of
an existing word or words, excluding others from using it should not, in the usual case,
result in cutting off access to common words by other would-be trademark owners.
For example, preventing others from using Kodak as a trademark for other types
of products should not result in any harm to other trademark users because Kodak is not
descriptively related to the function of cameras or any other type of product of which we
are aware. Other companies can select a trademark that does not come close to Kodak
without suffering any type of impairment to language sharing interests.125
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The foregoing discussion might be seen as an application of Lockean labor theory, in general, and of the
Lockean Proviso, in particular. In his classical word entitled Two Treaties of Government, the sixteenth
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before. She ought to be entitled to exclude others from using hat word unless to do so would mean that
others will not have sufficient access to the language to find or invent their own useful trademarks. In
assessing whether A’s appropriation unduly limits access, one is right to consider whether A’s made up
word is itself comprised of already existing words. If so, the potential costs for language sharing are likely
to be significant.
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By focusing on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and the potential
language sharing interests of the free rider we should be able to construct a more natural
and compelling set of limits on an anti free rider impulse than exist under current dilution
law. With its myopic concentration on concepts like blurring and tarnishment, dilution
law largely misses these issues. The result has been a body of law that is unnatural and
incoherent, both in its underlying justification and in its purported limiting devices.
D. The Identicality Issue
Another possible way to limit the anti free rider impulse would be to hold that
free riding on famous marks should only be actionable when the defendant uses the exact
same mark as the plaintiff’s famous mark. There is some support for this notion
historically. For example, in his seminal law review article, Frank Schechter limited his
original dilution proposal to cases where the defendant’s mark was identical to the
famous mark for which protection was sought.126 More recently, the United States
Supreme Court held in theVictoria’s Secret case that a federal dilution claim requires
proof of more than a mere mental association between the famous and accused mark, but
it limited this holding to cases where the accused and famous mark are not identical.127 It
thus held open the door to the possibility that federal dilution can be based on nothing
more than mere mental association when the marks are in fact identical.128 The upshot of
this holding is that it is now much easier to prove dilution claim if the famous and
accused marks are identical.129
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At first blush, the identicality notion promises to serve as an effective limiting
device on an anti free riding cause of action. One would think that courts should have
little difficulty in determining whether an accused mark is identical to the famous mark
for which protection is sought. One would also think that limiting protection in this
manner would eliminate a whole host of cases from eligibility for anti free riding
protection and that this would be a good thing. Indeed, the language sharing and
expressive freedom interests discussed above are less likely to be impaired if anti free
riding protection is limited in this fashion. This is so because those interests are less
strong when one wishes to use a mark that his exactly the same as a famous mark. If
nonidentical uses are exempt from liability, this might go a long way in protecting
legitimate interests grounded in expressive freedom and language sharing.
On the other hand, the identicality limitation may go too far in limiting protection.
The problem with this approach is that there are many instances where we intuitively
believe free riding is wrong and unjustifiable even where the accused mark is not
identical to the famous mark. Take for example the famous google mark discussed
above. If an on-line lending company were to call itself go$ogle.com, we would be
inclined to believe that this use should not be allowed. The reason is that the lending
company clearly is free riding on the fame of the distinctive google name and it is doing
so without any apparent justification. It does not need to use the Google mark in any
way. The meaning of the underlying English word – googol -- is not related to its lending
business in any manner we can determine. The mere fact that it has slightly altered the
Google mark – by substituting a dollar sign for one of the normal letters of the word -does not seem to be a compelling reason for either withholding anti free riding protection
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(as Schechter would have done) or for imposing a materially higher burden of proof on
Google (as the Victoria’s Secret holding does).
The fact that we intuitively feel free riding is unjustifiable in the google
hypothetical discussed above may lead courts to cheat. That is, they may be inclined to
modify the rule and hold that free riding on a famous mark is still wrong and actionable
so long as the accused mark is “substantially similar” to the famous mark. Or they may
stretch the identicality requirement in other ways to lessen its blow. For these reasons,
identicality, per se, probably would not be an effective limiting device.
The lesson to be derived from the identicality discussion is that the lack of
identicality between the famous and accused marks is another shorthand way for a court
to get at the true reason for withholding such protection: i.e., to impose such protection
might intrude too much on the language sharing or expressive freedom interests of the
person who wishes to use a mark that is similar to, but not identical to, the famous mark.
If this is so, it may be workable to have some kind of identicality requirement, so long as
it is applied in a sensitive and flexible fashion. As stated above, there are likely to be
cases where persons should not be allowed to use nonidentical marks that are highly
similar to, but not identical to, famous marks.
E.

Revisiting Some Decided Cases

In this section, I revisit some already-decided dilution cases to see how they can
be analyzed differently under the approach described here.
1.

The Victoria’s Secret Case130

There can be no doubt that the proprietor of Victor’s Secret was attempting to
free-ride off the fame of the Victoria’s Secret trademark. Victor’s Secret is very close to
130
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Victoria’s Secret. It should have been very easy for plaintiff to prove that consumers
mentally associated Victor’s Secret with Victoria’s Secret. I do not mean to imply that
consumers assumed there was any affiliation between the two entities. The district court
properly ruled that any such perception of affiliation was highly unlikely. Rather,
consumers undoubtedly thought of the Victoria’s Secret trademark when encountering the
Victor’s Secret trademark. This fact must have significantly influenced both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit to find in plaintiff’s favor.
Even so, the Supreme Court was right to overrule the lower courts’ injunction.
But the Supreme Court was right for the wrong reason. The Court ruled that the FTDA
requires actual dilution. This may or may not be so. In fact, the legislative history is
quite fuzzy on this point. The proper rationale for deciding the case is that Victoria’s
Secret is not the kind of trademark that should be eligible for expanded (anti free riding)
trademark protection at all. This is so because it is not a coined or quasi-coined word or
phrase. Victoria’s Secret is not even an arbitrary use of common words. Victoria’s
Secret probably was chosen by the women’s lingerie company to conjure up a connection
with Queen Victoria, who ruled during the “Victorian Age.” It is a widely held belief
that sexual mores were repressive during that age.131 By referring to “Victoria’s Secret,”
the lingerie company may have intended to convey the impression that while Queen
Victoria was outwardly prim and proper, behind the scenes she lived a voluptuous sexual
life. The sales pitch is clear: you may be a prim and proper American housewife, but
you too can dress sexy in secret.
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It would not be proper as a matter of basic language sharing and fairness to allow
one company to have a monopoly on common language that might be used to conjure up
this sort of imagery. The defendant in this case was, in essence, staking his claim to
access to this common language. His pitch was to men – to the “Victor’s” of this world,
who might want to appear prim and proper in public, but who equally desired a somewhat
raunchy private sex life. Victoria’s Secret assumed the risk of such free-riding when it
chose this sort of uncoined, common language as a trademark. From a trademark point of
view, it would have been better off selecting a more unique word or phrase to invest in.
2.

The WaWa Case

The WAWA case is also worth revisiting. The reader may recall that in the
Wawa case, the plaintiff owned and operated a number of convenience stores in the
Philadelphia area under the trademark “Wawa.” 132 Defendant started its own small store
in the same general geographic vicinity under the name “Haha.” Defendant stated that
the name “Haha” was related in some sense to his family name “Haaf.” The district court
was not persuaded of the relationship. The case proceeded solely on a dilution theory.
The district court found for the plaintiff and the Third Circuit affirmed.
At first blush, the holding seems sound from an anti-free-riding perspective.
Defendant clearly was free-riding of the fame of the plaintiff’s Wawa trademark. Wawa
seems coined and meaningless. It may sound a bit like a baby’s word for water, but that
is a stretch. Thus, it ought to be entitled to fairly strong anti-free-riding protection. The
problem, however, is that defendant’s mark does not duplicate or incorporate plaintiff’s
mark. Rather, it is a significantly different variation of it. It still conjures up plaintiff’s
mark, but it does so in a slightly humorous manner. Ha ha means something in the
132
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English language. Ha ha is a word we make when we wish to verbally signify laughter.
Defendant wishes to use the word ha ha, not in a way that describes the function of its
goods, but in a way that plays off the double meaning of the word in this context. It is at
once a joke (ha ha) and an allusion to the plaintiff’s trade name.
This case is a close call, but on balance defendant’s interests in expressive
freedom and language sharing seem to outweigh plaintiff’ interest in prevent free-riding
on its mark. The risk of any harm befalling plaintiff is extremely low precisely because
defendant’s mark significantly varies from plaintiff’s mark. The district court
undoubtedly sensed parasitic intent.133 And it thought this enough to justify an
injunction. It buttressed its intuition with unpersuasive assertions about the likelihood of
dilution. Had it thought more carefully about the defendant’s interests in using a
common word – ha ha – to describe it products, the court might have sensed that there
was a need to control the anti-free-riding impulse in this case.
To put matters differently, one might say that plaintiff has strong ownership
interests in wawa, but not in haha. They are two different words. Haha free rides on
Wawa, but it does more. It is a common English word. Wawa is made up. But it is close
to common English words that are not up – words like ha ha, ma ma, pa pa, or ta ta. In
choosing a word like Wawa as its trademark, plaintiff assumed the risk that other parties
may wish to appropriate any of these similar words for their own convenience stores or
other types of businesses. The key question judges should ask in these sorts of cases is
this: is plaintiff’s mark sufficiently unique that it did not assume the risk others could
come close merely by using common English words? When the answer to that question
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is “no,” then anti-free-riding protection should be denied. This is particularly true where,
as here, defendant’s mark varies considerably from plaintiff’s mark.134
3.

The Polaroid/Polaraid Case

A case we have not yet discussed, but which bears discussion in this context, is
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.135 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, applying the Illinois anti-dilution statute, found that the defendant’s use of
“Polaraid” for the installation of refrigeration and heating systems diluted the plaintiff’s
mark “Polaroid” for cameras.136 The likelihood of harm here was remote. People would
not be less likely to buy Polaroid camera because they had seen advertisements for
Polaraid cooling systems. The court nevertheless issued an injunction here because
defendant clearly was free riding on plaintiff’s mark.137
Under the proposal I advance here, the court would focus first on the strength of
the plaintiff’s property interests in the Polaroid mark. The word “Polaroid” appears to be
a fairly strong trademark. It is a coined word. However, even though it is an invented
word, it is comprised of an existing word with independent meaning in the English
language. Polar, as used in this context, probably alludes to the internal refraction of
light in a camera. A camera refracts light between two poles.138 Light goes through a
tiny hole at one pole of a camera and then branches out before landing on the other pole.
The addition of the “oid” component carries less apparent meaning. Oid might be a
134
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reference to a type of advanced or futuristic technology139 Oid has been added to other
made up words and it does appear to be particularly unique. Thus, while Polaroid is an
invented word, it is not completely meaningless. It utilizes at least one known word
(polar) which carries significant meaning in the English language and it relates that word
to the function of the product at hand – cameras.
On the other side of the equation are defendant’s interests in using Polaraid as a
trademark. Polaraid is a complex word as used in the context of this case. It seems
highly important that defendant sells heating and air conditioning equipment. Consumers
are likely to perceive the word “polar” as used here to be a reference to the North Pole of
the Earth. The North Pole is known to be cold.140 Consumers are likely to perceive the
word “aid” as a modifier of the word polar. Aid here might mean “reducer” or
“increaser,” depending on whether one is seeking to purchase heating or cooling
equipment. If one is seeking to buy heating equipment, polar aid might mean relief from
the cold. The defendant’s heating equipment reduces the polar air by supplying hot air.
Conversely, if one is seeking to buy air conditioning equipment, polar aid might mean the
addition of cold air into one’s house. Either way, Polaraid is a clever combination of two
known English words.
In these circumstances, defendant has a strong claim to use the words polar and
aid. They are previously existing English words. He is tapping directly and obviously
into those English meanings in a way that bears a logical and legitimate relationship to
the products he offers for sale. He may not be attempting to free-ride at all. Any
appearance of free-riding may be completely accidental.
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But let us assume the contrary. Let us assume that defendant is attempting to
free-ride on the Polaroid mark, or at least that he is not unaware of the fact that he is
capitalizing to some extent on the fame of thatmark. I make this assumption because I
think it is probably true. Moreover, even if the defendant did not intend to free-ride here,
it is likely that a considerable number of consumers would think of Polaroid when they
encountered the Polaraid mark.
Even so, the defendant’s conduct probably would not be enjoined under the
proposal I advance here. Where, as here, the defendant’s dual use claim seems credible
and related to the function of its products, the law should withhold an injunction. In this
situation, the defendant’s interests in tapping into common meanings of established
words should outweigh the plaintiff’s interests in preventing free-riding. To give plaintiff
superior rights would unduly limit defendant’s access to the words “polar” and “aid,”
when both words describe its products. It is not that defendant could not find another
suitable trademark that in no way alluded to the Polaroid mark. Rather, my point here is
that it is not fair to make the defendant do so. He should not have to steer clear of the
words “polar” and “aid” when those words relate so clearly to the function of his
products.
One might say, alternatively, that the plaintiff assumed the risk of such free-riding
when it chose to fashion its trademark from a common, existing word – polar. It was
unreasonable for plaintiff to assume that it would be able to prevent everyone else from
using that same word as a component part of their own marks. To give legal backing to
this unreasonable assumption would be a violation of the Lockean Proviso – which
requires property owners to leave “enough and as good” for others. Granting Polaroid
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injunctive relief in this case did not leave the owner of Polaraid with “enough and as
good” language to use in fashioning its own mark.141
I provide these examples of how the free-rider concept might be applied in
concrete cases not to persuade the reader of a particular result. Courts might come to
different conclusions about how to answer these questions. My point here is only to
suggest that the discussion about free-riding and its appropriate limits is more likely to
yield positive fruit if we focus on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and the
language sharing interest of the alleged free rider than on the blurring and tarnishment
concepts of current dilution law.
VII.

Toward A New Cause of Action: The European “Unfair Advantage” Claim
In the preceding sections I have demonstrated that current dilution law purports to

be about preventing dilutive harm, but really is about preventing free riding on famous
marks. I have also shown that the anti free riding impulse can be explained and justified
as an integral part of an “as between” type of analysis. I have shown that this analysis is
a more natural and compelling way to account for dilution cases than standard dilution
theory. I have further shown that the anti free riding impulse can be effectively limited
by focusing on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and on the alleged free
rider’s language sharing interests.
Still, I am aware that many readers may be reluctant to embrace an independent
cause of action that prevents free riding without in some way tying the cause of action to
141
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a theory of harm. I hope that some of these fears can be allayed by the fact that we are
not completely without guidance or precedent in this effort. We would not the first
country to adopt an anti free riding cause of action for famous trademarks that does not
depend on a harm-based concept like dilution. Many European countries have a cause of
action, explicitly denominated “unfair advantage,” which enables judges to punish freeriding without resort to tortured reasoning about alleged dilutive harm.
The European “unfair advantage” cause of action is based on the European
Directive on the Harmonization of Trademark Law (the “Directive”).142 It is often
included as an alternative basis of liability in the same statutory provision that makes
traditional dilution actionable. Specifically, article 4(4)(a) of the Directive allows
European Union Member States to refuse registration to trademarks that would take
unfair advantage of the reputation of a mark that has already been registered or is to be
registered within their territory. Article 4(4) (a) states:
Any member State may refuse registration or may declare invalid the trade mark
that is identical with, or similar to, an earlier national trade mark that is to be, or
has been, registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which
the earlier trade mark is registered, where the earlier trade mark has a reputation
in the Member State concerned and where the use of the later mark without due
cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the reputation of the earlier mark.143
Similarly, article 5(2) of the Directive states that Member States may entitle
trademark owners to enjoin the use of marks that would take unfair advantage of the
repute of their marks:
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade
any sign which is identical, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or
142
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services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and where
the use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark.144
A number of European countries have enacted unfair advantage statutes which
essentially track the EU Directives. Italian law is illustrative.145 For example, article
1.1[c] of the Italian Trademark Act146 provides that:
The owner of a registered mark has the right to prevent third parties, not having
his authorization, from using a sign identical with or similar to a mark registered
for dissimilar goods or services, if the registered mark enjoys a reputation in the
Country and if use of the sign without due cause permits the taking of unfair
advantage or, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the
mark.147
The Italian Trademark law also provides that marks that take unfair advantage of earlier
marks shall not be registered on the Italian trademark registry.148
The Italian Trademark Act thus provides expanded trademark protection under the
following circumstances. First, only registered marks that “enjoy a reputation” in the
Country (Italy) quality for this type of protection.149 The category of eligible marks
appears to be broader than the category of famous marks that enjoy anti dilution
protection in the United States. It appears that any mark that is sufficiently well known
to be subject to free riding is sufficiently well known to be eligible for the expansive
protections set forth in articles 1.1[c] and 17.1(g).150 This is not to say that any and all
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trademarks qualify for this expanded form of protection. To the contrary, it appears that
this protection is available for marks that due to their reputation carry and communicate a
symbolic message in a way that consumers will associate those marks with a junior
similar mark used in connection with dissimilar products.151
Second, there is conflicting law as to whether the unfair advantage cause of action
applies only to dissimilar goods cases, or whether it might also be applied in cases where
the plaintiff and the defendant are competitors (and thus sell similar types of goods). The
better view seems to be that the unfair advantage cause of action should apply only to
dissimilar goods.152
Third, the essence of the cause of action is the prevention of the taking of unfair
advantage of the reputation of the well known mark.153 This type of disallowed activity
is contrasted in the Italian statute with uses of well known signs that are detrimental to
the distinctive character of a well known mark. The latter concept is akin to the dilution
cause of action in the United States. Taking unfair advantage of a mark is clearly a
distinct type of wrong that is actionable under the Italian statute. The concept of unfair
advantage is meant to cover all instances where there is an attempt to take advantage -without due cause – on the reputation of the famous mark by exploiting and capitalizing
on its attractive value and commercial magnetism.154
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Fourth, Italian courts in general appear to have limited the unfair advantage
concept to cases where the defendant acted with demonstrable “parasitic intent.”155 In the
reported cases, it would appear that only intentional and knowing free riding is has been
enjoined under the unfair advantage prong of the Italian statute.
Several courts have had occasion to apply the unfair advantage prong of the
Italian statute. In all of these cases courts enjoined free riding on famous marks without
requiring proof of dilution. For example, in one case the Court of Milan held that the
defendant’s use of the sign (i.e., trademark) Nike Sports Fragrance, as used in connection
with perfumes and cosmetic products, took unfair advantage of the reputation of the
famous mark Nike, on the ground that the adoption of such similar sign was based on the
clear intent of the defendant to benefit from the celebrity and attractive value of the mark
belonging to the world wide leader in sporting garments.156 The Court did not require the
plaintiff to prove a likelihood of confusion or dilution, but rather based its decision on the
demonstrable free riding intent of the defendant.157
Similarly, in another case decided by the Court of Milan, it was held that
plaintiff’s famous mark AGIP, as used in connection with gasoline in Italy, was infringed
by the defendant’s use of the mark Acid (with a logo that was similar to the AGIP
logo).158 The Court stated was heavily influenced by the evidence of defendant’s intent
to capitalize on the reputation of the mark AGIP when they started marketing T-shirts
under a similar mark.159
155
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Finally, another Italian court held that the famous mark Pirelli, as used in
connection with tires, was infringed when a company attempted to use the same mark on
perfumes.160 Again, the court was concerned not with confusion as to source or dilution
as such, but rather with preventing an obvious attempt at unauthorized free riding. The
parasitic intent of the defendant provided an independent basis for enjoining its activity,
despite the lack of proof of any type of commercial harm to the plaintiff.
These cases illustrate that it is possible to punish free riding without resort to
traditional principles of dilution. They also illustrate that is possible to provide this
extended form of trademark protection without wreaking undue havoc in the law. The
Italian cause of action captures the essence of the anti free riding impulse and places it
under the banner “unfair advantage.” But it also attempts to limit that impulse by
including in the statute language that immunizes free riding that is justified by “due
cause.”161
It appears that Italian courts have not yet formulated a systematic doctrine for
what will and what will not qualify as due cause for free riding on a famous trademark.
However, at least one Italian decision may provide the seeds of a more developed theory.
In the case of Leonardo Bugatti & Soci s.r.l. v. Ducati Motorcycles,162 the Italian court of
Bologna refused the request of the famous Italian motorcycle maker, Ducati, to enjoin a
beer maker from selling beer under a similar name.
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The beer maker originally sold its beer under the label, Birra Ducatti, which it
later changed under pressure from the motor cycle company to Birra Ducatti Italiani.163
The Court rejected the motor cycle company’s contention that the use of the same mark
in connection beer took unfair advantage of or was detrimental to the reputation of
defendant’s mark.164 The decision was formally premised on the ground that the products
in question (motorcycles and beer) were so unrelated that any mental association in
consumers’ minds was unlikely.165
However, the consumer association rationale seems suspect. The marks were
nearly identical. Ducati had long been a famous mark for motor cycles in Italy. There
can be little doubt consumer would think of motor cycles when seeing the beer. And it
seems clear that defendant desired, to some extent, to take a free ride on fame that had
been created by the plaintiff. It seems more likely that the court’s unwillingness to enjoin
the defendant from continued use of the Ducati mark had to do with the fact that ducatti
is not a coined or even quasi-coined word in Italian. It means “dukes” and is generally
understood a reference to that period in Italian feudal history when various dukes ruled
the land.166 In these circumstances, the court’s ruling would have been decided the exact
same way under the rules I propose here.
Because the Italian word “ducatti” is not coined and not particularly distinctive (in
Italian), it can be said that the motor cycle company, in selecting such a mark to make
famous and invest with secondary meaning, assumed the risk that other businesses in
unrelated fields would be entitled to take a free ride on its investment. Given the
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overwhelming fame in Italy of Ducati motorcycles, it is difficult to believe that the
defendant was not attempting to free-ride on that fame. But the free riding was
considered justifiable here because the defendant’s legitimate right to tap into the primary
meaning of the Italian word for “dukes” as part of its own trademark
As the Ducati case illustrates, it ought to be possible to develop limits on an anti
free riding cause of action that are based on considerations of language sharing and
expressive freedom. The problem with the European model, however, is that it does not
appear to be formally limited to any particular way. Rather, judges are given this vague
statutory phrase – unfair advantage – and told only to limit it based on finds of due cause.
One can find some attempts in the decided cases to impose such limits,167 but, again,
these attempts have been far from systematic.
Any adoption of the European model into American law would, therefore, require
modification to include limitations which would ensure appropriate protections for
justifiable free riding. Above I argued that such limitations might be grounded in
theories about language sharing and expressive freedom.168 In order to safeguard these
interests, a person should not be enjoined from using a mark that is the same or similar to
a famous mark whenever the person (1) is not free-riding on that mark, but rather is
tapping into the same underlying meanings that the famous mark happens to tap into; or
(2) is partially free-riding on the mark, but this free riding is justifiable given the person’s
interest in access to various parts of the English language.
These language sharing concerns could be dealt with in a variety of ways. Judges
might wish to balance the respective property rights of the parties; they might wish to
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fashion bright line rules; or they may wish to adopt some mixture of these two approach.
Here, I argue that the latter approach is preferable. Expansive anti free riding protection
should be categorically limited to coined and quasi coined famous marks, and that even
with respect to such marks an injunction should be withheld whenever the defendant is
tapping into meanings that exist in the English language separate and distinct from the
fame of plaintiff’s mark.
By coined, I mean completely made up words– i.e., words that simply did not
exist before they were invented by the trademark owner. Kodak is an example; Xerox is
another. Under the proposal I advance here, anti free riding protection might also extend
to quasi-coined words, by which I mean words that are partially comprised of invented
components. Polaroid is such a word. It did not exit before the camera company
invented it, but it is not wholly made up either. It includes the known word polar.
Nevertheless, it is sufficiently distinct and creative to include itin the category of marks
that are eligible for expansive trademark protection.
I would also include in the quasi-coined category words that are creatively
derived (partially made up) from obscure words. Google is an example of this type of
word. It was derived from the existing and obscure word googol (which signifies the
number one with a hundred zeros). Although Google is pronounced the same as the
known English word on which it is based (googol) and is only spelled slightly differently,
it appears to be sufficiently obscure and unknown to the vast majority of Americans that
it is the functional equivalent of a coined word.
The point here is not to suggest that Google would always win in an anti free
riding lawsuit. To the contrary, there may be cases where another party is justified in free
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riding on Google’s name. This could occur, for example, if a math book company named
itself Googol – in an attempt to tap into the connection between the huge number
(googol) and the purpose of studying math (number mastery). In any event, the point
here is only to show that there is no compelling reason why the famous mark Google
should be ineligible per se for expansive anti free riding protection.
Limiting anti-free riding protection to coined and quasi-coined marks would be a
quick and fairly easy way to ensure that the new cause of action does not interfere with
other parties’ legitimate reasons for free-riding. Indeed, one rarely has a good reason for
free riding on a mark that has been entirely made up by someone else. Moreover,
protection should not be automatic even for these types of marks. As I demonstrated
above, judges shouldask in every case whether an injunction would unduly limit the
defendant’s interests in language sharing and expressive freedom.169
VIII.

Intellectual History – Revisiting Schechter
In Section II of this article I mentioned that the dilution concept as exhibited in

American trademark law has often been traced to a 1927 law review article by Frank
Schechter, a New York attorney.170 Schechter’s original proposal applied only to coined,
fanciful, or arbitrary marks, only to situations in which the junior user’s mark was
identical to that of the senior user, and only to use of identical marks on noncompeting
goods.171 Schechter was not primarily concerned with preventing dilutive harm; rather,
he was primarily concerned with protecting the property interests that arise in famous
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mark due to their unique function as creating and reinforcing commercial custom (i.e.,
cementing the link between consumer and mark owner).
To be sure, Schechter argued that marks can be harmed in ways that go beyond
the traditional likelihood of confusion type of harm (i.e., the diversion of customers from
mark owner to mark impersonator).172 And Schechter discussed the notion of the
diminishment of a mark’s selling power as a type of harm that falls outside the traditional
likelihood of confusion paradigm. But Schecter’s discussion of harm was, in my view,
largely an add-on. It was a way to supplement an already strong property theory with
something more. It was, in lawyer’s language, an “even if” type of argument. Schechter
was essentially saying that even if the pure property view is not enough to justify broad
rights in trademarks, then those rights are further justified given the possibility that such
marks might be harmed in a variety of ways if others are permitted to use them widely.
The harm component was thus not essential to Schecter’s theory. But Schechter
did not do a good enough job in articulating why free riding on famous marks is wrong in
one situation and acceptable in another. The harm prong of his theory thus served a
purpose in the development of the dilution concept in American law: it furnished a
potential (and alluring) boundary device for this expansive cause of action. That is, as
the law developed in this area, legislators, courts and commentators all attached to the
dilution concept as a way of articulating and hopefully cabining the new cause of action.
The result, eventually, is dilution law as we have come to know it.
The problem with these developments is that harm has served as an illusory
boundary. The concept of dilutive harm has not been easy to pin down. As I
demonstrated above, we can never be very sure whether a mark is famous enough to
172
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quality for dilution protection, but we are even less sure whether the mark has been
harmed to a sufficient degree or in the specified way to warrant anti dilution protection.
The harm boundary has thus not fulfilled its promise.173 It has not functioned as a useful
limiting device.
More fundamentally, it is wrong to focus too much on harm in these cases. The
most compelling rationale for offering an expanded form of property protection to
famous trademarks lies in a multi-faceted balancing approach that focuses mostly on the
comparative interests of the famous mark owner in protecting her investment (an interest
that is limited by the type of mark she chose to make famous) and the relative interests of
the would be mark user in tapping into the underlying language that the famous mark
employs. Considerations of harm, including dilutive harm, may figure in the analysis.
But they are best seen as subsidiary to the issue of who has a superior interest in
controlling a particular piece of language.
It is not particularly helpful to elevate these harm-based concerns to a central
place in trademark law. To do so is to miss the point of why anti free riding protection
ought to be available for a certain class of famous trademarks. It is for this reason that
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Victoria’s Secret case, in which the Court
heightened the harm requirement and mandated that plaintiffs show that actual dilutive
harm has already begun to occur, is misguided.174 The malleability of the likelihood of
dilution standard has enabled judges to punish free riding in some situations where it
should be punished. It is wrong to require actual harm when the essence of the cause of
action is the prevention of free riding. In short, the Court has exacerbated the wrong turn
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that was taken long ago in dilution law when it came to focus so fully on harm as a
limiting device.
The proposal advanced here seeks to return to the more property-centered view
offered by Frank Schechter in 1927. Harm would not play a primary role in the scheme
put forward here. Rather, famous coined and quasi coined marks would receive a broad
form of property protection regardless of whether the use of the same mark by another
entity would be likely to injure the mark owner – in the sense of causing a diminishment
of the selling power of the mark or in the sense of tarnishing the image of the mark
owner.
However, the proposal advanced here is also significantly different than the one
offered by Schechter. First, Schechter did not fully analyze why free riding on coined
marks is unacceptable but free riding on other types of marks might be acceptable. Nor
did he focus on the theoretical underpinnings of the anti free riding concept – its ultimate
grounding in the as between type of argument and its reliance on harm only as a
peripheral justification. Finally, he did not explore the countervailing interests in
allowing people to use famous marks – particularly the interests in language sharing and
expressive freedom.175
Another area in which the proposal advanced here differs from the original
Schechter proposal concerns whether anti free rider protection should be available to
prevent the use of marks that are only similar to, but not identical to, the famous mark for
which protection is sought. Schechter, without much explanation, limited his original
proposal to identical marks.176 That is, he would have offered expanded trademark
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protection only as a device for enjoining the use of a mark that was identical to the
famous mark for which protection is sought.177 I think Schechter was wrong in this
respect. As I show above, there are compelling cases involving nonidentical marks
where anti free riding protection should be available.178 And that protection should not
necessarily entail more difficult proof requirements than situations involving identical
marks.179
IX.

Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that American dilution law focuses too much on harm

and not enough on the anti-free-riding impulse and its limits. Harm is always possible
when free-riding occurs, but it should not be the focus of an anti-free-riding law suit.
This is so because ultimately the issue in such suits is whether the property interests of
the plaintiff outweigh the language sharing and expressive freedom interests of the
defendant. Focusing too much on harm distracts courts from this ultimate issue. In some
cases, a focus on harm may function as a proxy for such concerns, but even if this is true,
it is a clumsy and distracting doctrinal tool. By focusing on harm to the exclusion of
these other interests courts are likely to offer too little protection in some cases and too
much protection in others.
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The United States Supreme Court has made matters worse by ruling that dilution
requires proof of actual harm.180 Actual harm rarely is present in these cases; nor should
it be required to justify injunctive relief. The question of how imminent harm must be
before relief can be granted is a wrong turn in this area of the law. The focus should
instead by on the type of mark chosen by the plaintiff; specifically whether it is coined
and distinctive, or whether it is merely an amalgamation of common words. The more
distinctive the plaintiff’s mark, the stronger the protection should be. Indeed, the
proposal advanced here would provide expanded trademark protection only to coined or
quasi-coined words.
Equally important in these cases are defendants’ interests in language sharing and
expressive freedom. These interests receive the bulk of their protection by limiting
expanded trademark rights to coined or quasi-coined marks. However, even coined
marks should not receive unlimited protection. There are legitimate reasons for using
marks that are similar to coined marks. Proper judicial sensitivity to these reasons is
more likely to occur if they are openly debated.
Dilution law, as originally conceived and proposed, was more akin to the
proposal I make here than to dilution law as it is currently configured in the United
States. In his seminal law review article on the subject, Frank Schechter urged a broad
type of property right for certain types of trademarks. His examples all involved coined
marks which were copied without justification. He argued that the expanded right was
grounded in a property type rationale, not primarily in a tort rationale. Dilution law’s
departure from this paradigm has come at a high cost. American dilution law is
incoherent and masks the underlying interests which are at stake in these cases. The
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proposal advanced here is an attempt to refocus dilution law on its proper aim – the
protection of invented language against unjustified free riding.
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